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NEO-HUSSERLIAN MEDITATIONS:  
EXTENDING INTENTIONALITY TO  






I seek here to return to the original spirit of Edmund Husserl’s “radicalism.” To be radical means to be 
both rooted in a tradition and to retrace a path back to one’s roots. According to the position I advocate, 
phenomenology may be reconceived of as an enterprise in realism. Through a creative rereading of one 
of phenomenology’s founding texts, Husserl’s Cartesian Meditations, I suggest that phenomenology 
can indeed provide us with a semantics applicable to realist ontologies, provided we excise phenome-
nological concepts from their subjectivist framework, providing a new structure with which to analyze 
reality. Specifically, Husserl’s eidetic Apriori may be reconceived as denoting the inherent dynamism of 
existents. Movement would be the basis of manifestation, a universal category unconditioned in itself. 
That which appears need not be synonymous with all that which is given to experience. The eidos is the 
manifold of coiled movements awaiting manifestation, whilst the a priori is movement in itself. Fol-
lowing Graham Harman’s lead, I expand the scope of the Husserlian idea of intentionality, reconceptu-
alizing it as the directionality pertaining to any process whatsoever. Following Jaakko Hintikka, I take 
the cogito to be nothing other than performativity in its emergent state. Several different phenomenal 
horizons can connect to the same type of intentionality. The nonlinear nature of temporality means 
that even radically distant horizons are capable of sharing in the same intentionality. Once reenvisioned 
as a “genuine universal ontology” (this is Husserl’s expression), phenomenological semantics can be 
extended to include any and all types of existents. First phenomenology need not maintain the primacy 
of perception or subjectivity. 
Key words: eidos, Graham Harman, Edmund Husserl, intentionality, phenomenology, realism, specu-
lative realism.
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НЕОГУССЕРЛИАНСКИЕ МЕДИТАЦИИ:  
РАСПОСТРАНЯЯ ИНТЕНЦИОНАЛЬНОСТЬ  






В статье предпринята попытка вернуться к  исходному духу «радикализма» Эдмунда Гуссер-
ля. Быть радикальным  — значит быть укорененным в  традиции, но, в  то же время, возвра-
щаться по пройденному пути обратно, вплоть до своих корней. Согласно позиции, которую я 
отстаиваю, феноменологию можно переосмыслить как обоснование реализма. Исходя из но-
ваторского прочтения одного из  основополагающих феноменологических текстов, а  именно 
«Картезианских Медитаций» Гуссерля, я обосновываю предположение, согласно которому фе-
номенология действительно может обеспечить нас семантикой, применимой к реалистическим 
онтологиям при условии, что мы освободим феноменологические понятия от их субъективист-
ского контекста и тем самым получим новую структуру для анализа реальности. В частности, 
эйдетическое априори Гуссерля может быть переосмыслено в качестве выражения внутреннего 
динамизма существующих вещей. Движение оказывается основанием явления, универсальной 
категорией, которая сама по себе ничем не обусловлена. Являющееся необязательно равнознач-
но всему тому, что дано в опыте. Эйдос представляет собой многообразие свернутых движений, 
ожидающих манифестации, в то время как a priori является движением самим по себе. Следуя 
Грэму Харману, я расширяю границы применения гуссерлевского понятия интенционально-
сти, переопределяя его как направленность, присущую любому процессу вообще. Следуя Якко 
Хинтикке, я понимаю cogito как перформативность в ее эмерджентном состоянии. Несколько 
различных горизонтов могут соединяться в рамках интенциональности одного и того же типа. 
Нелинейная структура темпоральности означает, что даже радикально различающиеся гори-
зонты могут принадлежать одной и той же интенциональности. Будучи пересмотрена как «ис-
ходная универсальная онтология», если пользоваться выражением самого Гуссерля, феноме-
нологическая семантика может быть расширена таким образом, что она будет включать в себя 
все типы сущего. Первая феноменология не должна отстаивать первичность восприятия или 
субъективности. 
Ключевые слова: эйдос, Грэм Харман, Эдмунд Гуссерль, интенциональность, феноменология, ре-
ализм, спекулятивный реализм.
INTRODUCTION
Are there legitimate realist usages for phenomenology? Does phenomenology, 
outside of the phenomenological tradition proper, have a future? In this essay, I intro-
duce some preliminary considerations that may possibly provide some clues pertain-
ing to the resolution of these two intimately interrelated questions. Specifically, the 
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goal here is the uncovering of a pathway leading back to the original radicalism of Ed-
mund Husserl’s phenomenology. In particular, Husserl’s 1931 Cartesian Meditations, 
based on his 1929 Sorbonne lectures, will be of special interest. Cartesian Meditations 
is arguably one of the most important texts in phenomenology, as it served to intro-
duce Husserl’s ideas in France through Emmanuel Levinas’ translation (Moran, 2000, 
320). During the course of this investigation, I propose that, instead of adhering to 
supposed phenomenological dogmas, precepts or rules of phenomenological inquiry, 
we rather abandon what we think we know about what phenomenology is and how 
the rich and varied semantics of this tradition ought to be used. Specifically, I choose 
radical epoche as my point of departure, a bracketing to be applied to Husserlian phe-
nomenology as such. This epoche is an echo of Husserl’s own treatment of Carte-
sianism in Cartesian Meditations. Husserl chooses Descartes as a point of departure 
precisely because of the radical skepticism of Cartesian philosophy. In his search for a 
regulative idea, Descates is led to abandon belief in an external world in favor of a re-
duction that leaves nothing intact apart from the cogito. What Husserl proposes at the 
outset of Cartesian Meditations is a thoroughgoing reworking, a “radical development 
of Cartesian motifs” coupled with a rejection of “nearly all the well-known doctrinal 
content of the Cartesian philosophy” (Husserl, 1960, 1). We may take this methodo-
logical position as the starting point in our own “Neo-Husserlian” meditations. Nearly 
all of the doctrinal content of Husserlian phenomenology must be abandoned. Yet 
this project could potentially yield some very interesting fruits indeed: a realist appli-
cation of phenomenological semantics. 
THE UNFOLDING OF THE APRIORI,  
CONCEIVED OF AS PURE EXPLICATION
First off, a vitally important methodological question must be asked. Is this ex-
periment even legitimate? The approach to a renewed phenomenology, or at least, a 
refreshened usage of recycled phenomenological semantics, demands the reassembly 
of elements whose constitutions proves indissoluble enough to compose something 
akin to a solvent, or fluid state, without completely disintegrating into incoherence. 
The primal form, so to speak, of phenomenology can be summarized in a single con-
cept: self-responsibility. It is the responsibility of the meditator to strive for absolute 
self-responsibility, otherwise we as “first philosophers” could not hope to begin again. 
The truth of radicalness resides in making “that radicalness true for the first time by 
enhancing it to the last degree” (Husserl, 1960, 6). Hence we discover in the Introduc-
tion to Husserl’s Meditations two fundamental concepts that shall be of immense as-
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sistance to our own investigation: radicalness and enhancement. These two elements 
would seem here to form a bond. The radical element corresponds to that which is 
first. Initiating any project corresponds to putting down roots: the Late Latin phrase 
radicalis corresponds to “of or having roots”1. Phenomenology would, according to 
this view, constitute a return to an origin. But which origin would this be? What is 
the origin of? And whose origin are we talking about here? Husserl suggests at the 
outset that we must return to the ego, albeit one extended beyond the empirical self in 
both space and time. His ego is a transcendental one, an ubiquitous affectivity with-
out any determinate borders2. The ego as flux os not a human being, neither is it any 
individual lifeform in particular. One could say that it is the boundlessness of life in 
general. But another concept would seem to contradict the desire for rootedness we 
have uncovered here: enhancement. Husserl seeks to enhance Cartesianism “to the 
last degree.” Here is a true contradiction in terms. In North American youth slang, 
we find a—radically—different definition of radicalness: being “radical,” in this latter 
sense means being “at the limits of control”3. The enhancement of phenomenology is 
indissolubly connected with an inner tension latent within its own self-definition. It is 
abundantly clear even from the Introduction, not to speak of the rest of the text, that 
Husserl is attempting to square the circle: those radicals who commence first philos-
ophy through their meditations are working on a supposedly “rational grounding” of 
what is intended to become a future science (Husserl, 1960, 4). But the achievement 
of grounding first philosophy necessitates a complete ungrounding, an overthrow of 
all existing forms of knowledge.
Husserl’s chemical mixture constanly threatens to overflow. Its volatility is par-
adoxically commensuate with its groundedness. To become rerooted, Husserlian sci-
1 https://www.etymonline.com/word/radical
2 Husserl is quite unequivocal on this point. The transcendental ego is all-encompassing, being a uni-
versal form-of-forms. It contains the entirety of the world within itself, in the sense of constituting 
a solipsistic entirety: 
 “The universe of subjective processes, which are the ‘really inherent’ cnsciousness-constituents of the 
transcendental ego, is a universe of compossibilities only in the universal unity-form of the flux, in 
which all particulars have their respective places as processes that flow within it” (Husserl, 1960, 
75). There is only an ego, but this ego contains all, which means nothing is really lost even if we 
accept a solipsistic reading of Husserlian phenomenology. The flows are still present, in spite of 
their being posited as being internal to an ego. As Dermot Moran notes, in this view Husserl was 
profoundly influenced by the American psychologist and philosopher William James: As Husserl 
admitted, James played a formative role in his own thinking on the nature of consciousness as a 
living seamless flux, with contents which are in central focus surrounded by a ‘halo’ of less focused 
contents” (Moran, 2000, 71).
3 https://www.etymonline.com/word/radical
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ence must uproot everything. Each rerooting is also a rerouting. Radical philosophy 
is a paradoxical exercize in “overthrowing all science” (Husserl, 1960, 7). Every form 
of knowledge must fall victim to an all-ecompassing, infinitely emptying epoche or 
bracketing. If the composition can be proven solvent, first philosophy shall not be 
exposed as something fundamentally bankrupt, insolvent, too volatile for usage. Our 
nascent system could easily give birth to unviable seeds, confining entire strands of 
thought to passive intuitions or a catastrophic logocentric enclosure. Phenomenology 
itself is not immune to the epoche. If we are to be consistent, and true to the spirit of 
Cartesian Meditations, then radical doubt must be extended to Husserl’s own propo-
sitions as well. The radicalness of Husserlian uprooting provides a guarantee against 
full closure, for its reflexivity allows for a mirroring of phenomenology’s operations. 
Specifically, what I am suggesting is that we take seriously Husserl’s injunction to not 
adopt the content, but rather the spirit of Cartesianism (Husserl, 1960, 6). Following 
in the footsteps of Husserl, let us forget, or even completely abandon the content of 
phenomenology and rather embrace the double-sided radicalness of first phenom-
enology. This is not to suggest that we are the first in this nor, for that matter, that 
Husserl was the first phenomenologist in a temporal-historical sense4. Being “first” 
is a qualitative term, a designation pertaining to the space of intuitive duration. That 
which is initial is a qualitative value and not a quantity. Quantities lack value, for 
value pertains to differentials (everything becomes somewhat similar once subjected 
to the count). All ideas and concepts may be found at the outset in “a state of inde-
terminate fluid generality” (Husserl, 1960, 8). How exactly a realistically utilized phe-
nomenological semantics will even look like cannot be forecasted or predicted with 
any degree of certainty. This is entire essay is a thought experiment, a highly specific 
sequence whose outcome is, however, for the moment, open to infinite contestation. 
I can have no fixed idea about what I am attempting to achieve at this initial juncture. 
Even “reality” as such must be conceived of as an incomplete idea. In his commentary 
upon Cartesian Meditations, David Smith notes that all evidence is “  ‘imperfect,’ or 
incomplete: it does not, and cannot, give us the entirety of the object” (Smith, 2003, 
172). Thought cannot exhaust the entirety of any object whatsoever. Conveniently, 
this affords us with an opportunity to forget phenomenology’s anthropocentrism and 
mind-centrism. Certain phrases and concepts selected from Husserl’s Meditations 
may be reutilized in a manner that differs in content from the original construct. 
4 Among other more famous usages, the word “phenomenology” was used by theologian Friedrich 
Christoph Oetinger to describe divine relations otherwise inaccessible to human consciousness or 
rational reflection. The “phenomenological” would thus denote the sphere of speculative knowl-
edge (Auberlen, 1847).
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Turning to the First Meditation, we see an emphasis upon “expression.” Husserl states 
in no uncertain terms that “expression as such has its own comparatively good or 
bad way of fitting what is meant or itself given; and therefore it has its own evidence 
or non-evidence” (Husserl, 1960, 11). The overthrow of knowledge, phenomenology 
included, gives us carte blanche to interpret any of Husserl’s statements in any manner, 
with the sole proviso that we achieve some kind of philosophical fluid whose combus-
tibility allows for manipulation and pragmatic reapplication. Expression has its own 
givenness, and each form of expression has its own form of evidence or non-evidence. 
The world is full of different forms of expression, each given in a manner that fits 
with its own functions. Microparticles coated with unique binding specificities, say, 
a layer of graphene that transforms particles into components of a communicating 
superconductive surface, give expression to evidences of communicativity on a na-
no-scale level (Di Bernardo et al., 2017, 1–9). Throughout existence, there are count-
less types of manifestation. Achievement of an active synthesis means the activation 
of first philosophy as a self-assembling system, whose components can be enmeshed 
among various sciences promiscuously and freely. Rerooting is a skewing of first phe-
nomenology’s intentionality. 
What we must prove is that phenomenology, or at least phenomenologically 
oriented semantics, can operate in a manner which takes the multiple modes of ex-
istence seriously. Indeed, at the end of Meditations, Husserl himself does mention the 
possibility, albeit in a fairly obscure manner, of an “all-embracing apriori phenome-
nology” (Husserl, 1960, 155). The goal here is to expand the idea of intentionality be-
yond the scope of Husserl’s idea of what phenomenology ought to be. In experimental 
philosophy, there are no “oughts.” What else could an “Apriori” be, if not the actual 
unfolding of some fact, an absolute unfolding that correlates with a certain mode of 
analysis? The attempt of Husserlian phenomenology to found itself exclusively upon 
the mental operations of a transcendental consciousness depends entirely upon an 
original delimitation, but this does not exclude the possibility of there existing an 
infinite variety of other delimitations, positions and latent genetic concepts within 
the structure of phenomenology. In order to understand what an Apriori is, we must 
first grasp the meaning of the eidetic. An eidos, according to Husserl’s definition of the 
term, is a “universal” that is “unconditioned”, a “universal not conditioned by any fact” 
(Husserl, 1960, 71). Differently put, the eidos is a science fiction produced by first phe-
nomenology as concept-factory. The eidetic is that which precedes concepts, a posi-
tionality whose sense can only be intuited, but never conceptualized. Problem-delimi-
tations are created by eidetic means, extending themselves in a variety of materialities. 
The universal Apriori is the initial innumerable produced by eidos, and as such, must 
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precede the advent of other elements within the system, conceived of as a series pro-
ducing ever larger and more complex structures. Invoking a non-equilibrium state, 
formation reroutes the original positionality into unconditional proliferation. Belying 
its own name, the Apriori can only instantiate its own operations by coming second 
in relation to the unconditional universality. Defining the universality of the Apriori, 
conceived of as the actualized unfolding of form internal to eidos, remains an inscru-
table project, as this initiation can only arrive after the unconditioned has been em-
placed. “The universal Apriori,” we are told by Husserl himself, persists as “an eidetic 
form, which contains an infinity of forms, an infinity of apriori types of actualities 
and potentialities of life” (Husserl, 1960, 74). Let us imagine somebody with access to 
the original typescript of Cartesian Meditations, a person irritated, say, by its excessive 
attention to the life of consciousness, or even, the vitalistic attachment to the concept 
of life exhibited here. What if this person were to have rewritten the sentence, erasing 
the latter phrase: “of life?” 
The innumberable that is eidos need not pertain to any particular being or ag-
gregate of beings. Husserl already paints with a broad brush when he connects actu-
alities and potentialities, already vague categories in themselves, with “life”. True, this 
life should be that of the transcendental ego—but, following Husserl’s own injunction 
to follow the spirit and not the letter of Descartes, let us abandon any attachment to 
both life and ego (the life of the ego included) and define the universal Apriori in the 
following manner, befitting a neo-Husserlian system of recycled phenomenological 
semantics: the universal Apriori, in as much as it is truly infinite, must constitute an 
infinite unfolding of actualities and their correlative potentialities. The actual unfold-
ing will remain challenging. However, the pleasures intendant upon the realization of 
the most complex and radical rerouting of first phenomenology outweigh the costs. 
Equating the Apriori with explication exhibits difficulties, but only insofar as we per-
sist in erroneously associating unconditionedness with the lack of movement. Being 
unconditioned is a far from original mode of givenness. Rather, it is the commence-
ment of a new explication, a procurement of this particular activity on the part of first 
phenomenologists. Determinations, within their Apriori state, are called “noematic.” 
These are emplaced within a state of absolute freedom, a negative freedom denoting 
the absence of higher structures or organizational principles. In the Apriori state, the 
noema could stand for anything, being an original dynamic mode whose every con-
dition can be considered true, accepted at face value, because it is prior to the intro-
duction of value into first phenomenology (Husserl, 1960, 36). Jacques Derrida relates 
the Husserlian noema to the realm of actualized, auto-positional materiality. A “real 
nonappurtenance to any region at all, even to the archi-region, this anarchy of the 
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noema is the root and very possibility of objectivity and of meaning” (Derrida, 2005, 
204). Hence, objectivity is already internal to phenomenology. There is no way of es-
caping the object. Smith is entirely correct in pointing our that “the reality of anything 
worldly would noematically correspond to nothing short of an absolute, adequate, 
infinite consciousness of it” (Smith, 2003, 173). Because such a perception is impos-
sible, each and every object must be conceived of as constituting an inexhaustible 
infinity, a thing that recedes from access. Pure explication is the movement preceding 
conditioning. Given prior to givenness, the noema, characterized by Derrida as the 
anarchic precursor to every passive and active synthesis, is the basis of true values. 
Innumberability pertains to movement prior to its advent as being, prior even to the 
eminently logistical procurement of every activity. Movement without activity: such 
would be the emptied noema, the innumberable infinity prior to a reduced, truncated, 
particularized and actual phenomenology. The universality of this moment, deeply 
embedded within Husserlian meditation, is a direct consequence of the object’s un-
boundedness. If only Husserl had stayed true to his own intentionality, and kept his 
promise of handing his readers a truly, authentically universal phenomenology! The 
objective realm would then have been preserved, without falling prey to subjectivism. 
A pure phenomenology relating the original mode of unintentioned commu-
nion must posit an “incessant flux,” an abyssal movement characteristic of presence, 
already coded as eidetic in its nature (Husserl, 1960, 48). Movement is already there at 
the outset, ever-present, even at the commencement of philosophy as science-fiction. 
Provided we leave open the issue of phenomenological veracity, we can definitively 
reorder the priorities of philosophical research, a task that necessitates a thorouhgo-
ing recoding of the phenomenological semantic. Departing from Husserl’s own idea 
of intentionality, we must persevere in our fidelity to the pure heterogeneity of expli-
cation. Intentionality is not a characteristic of consciousness alone. Rather, it means 
directionality. Graham Harman makes the case that intentionality, once reconsidered 
in a non-anthropocentric manner, can be conceived of as a descriptive term for the 
inherent determinateness of objects. Any specificity or directionality which gives ob-
jects concreteness is intentional (Harman, 2005, 22–23). Intentionality means noth-
ing more than the specificity of this object in particular. Nothing accesses Being in it-
self; each mode of being accesses a specific, individual, concrete object-in-motion. As 
Harman states, “the concreteness of intentionality” pertains “to every possible layer 
of reality, not only to human awareness. To remain concrete does not mean to remain 
confined within the human sphere” (Harman, 2005, 23). Physical causality too is inten-
tional, for each object effects other objects in a certain direction or manner. Therefore, 
pure explication, once subjected to a universal ontological usage, would constitute a 
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feature of each and every object-in-motion. The inability of consciousness to exhaust 
the infinite singularity of any object, as posited by Husserl, is a preliminary to the gen-
eralized mutual inaccessibility of objects which forms an essential core of speculative 
realism, defined as a philosophy that would take the reality of objects seriously5. If we 
are to come to terms with the challenges and tremendous possibilities latent within 
the concept of the dynamic Apriori, we must first break down the barriers separating 
us from a genuine understanding of the Husserlian idea of “explication.” If the Apriori 
is an unfolding, that is, a category suitable for inclusion within genetic, that is, dynam-
ic phenomenology (conceived of as a sub-department of first phenomenology), then 
the truth of its movement and the heterogeneity of constitutional theories in general 
must be proven. Wherein does the purity of an explication reside? Strangely enough, 
Husserl suggests that pure explication, while denoting a first movement, the initiation 
of a process, is infinitely remote from the singular. The initial innumberable is not a 
singularity, a remote, inaccessible One, but rather a multiplicity whose heterogeneity 
excludes even the possibility of any enumeration. Pure explication is the intentional, 
that is, directionally-oriented unfolding of an innumerable manifold. Thus Husserl: 
“pure explication unfolds, in a concatenation of particular intuitions the object’s very 
own determinations, the ‘internal’ determinations” (Husserl, 1960, 101). The phrase 
“intuition” need not bother us: it may easily and unproblematically be replaced with 
“intentionality.” This latter term, in Husserl’s original usage, describes the directional 
nature of perception: “the word intentionality signifies nothing else than this funda-
mental property of consciousness: to be conscious of something” (Husserl, 1960, 33). 
Extending intentionality to anything whatsoever, we may restate this definition in the 
following manner: intentionality describes the directional nature of anything whatsoev-
er. Every Apriori—and there could very well be several—is in a state of flux, prior to 
5 Husserlian phenomenology states in no uncertain terms that the meaning of an object can never 
be filled by perception. There remains a gap between the object in itself and perception. Elsewhere, 
for instance in Logical Investigations, this is stated even more explicitly. Husserl’s example of the 
blackbird flying through a garden provides Harman with ammunition for his realist rereading of 
the phenomenological and Continental tradition: “Husserl draws a distinction between simple 
meaning-intention and direct meaning-fulfillment. I hear my uncle cry out that a blackbird flies in 
the garden, but am currently so bored and lazy that I take his word for it and never even look. As I 
reflect on what he says, my attention is directed toward the unseen blackbird, but only in a vague, 
emptily verbal sort of way. By contrast, my uncle seems to encounter the blackbird in its bodily 
reality by way of direct perception, a far more fulfilling intention than my own. Yet even my uncle 
only sees the bird from one specific angle, forever failing to grasp all of its features at a single glance. 
As we pass from me in my lazy state to my uncle in his alert and observant one, there does seem 
to be some sort of improvement-a closer approach to the blackbird itself ” (Harman, 2005, 27). But 
neither me nor my uncle shall ever actually directly access the movement of the blackbird. 
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the advent of first phenomenology. Derrida does not err when he equates genesis with 
movement and structure with static phenomenology: “there are some givens which 
must be described in terms of structure, and others which must be described in terms 
of genesis” (Derrida, 2005, 194). The eidetic Apriori establishes itself as a self-assem-
bling constitution of poles and synthetic unities, not yet given but approaching man-
ifestation. Whether an object achieves manifestation or not is dependent upon the 
energy differentials each materiality manages to extract from the concatenation of 
potentialities it is surrounded by. Objects prior to manifestation form untapped reser-
voirs trapped within indeterminacy, but already too heterogeneous to form counted, 
named subjects of description. They are several, but in a qualitative sense. Prior to 
manifestation, there is an indeterminate—therefore eidetic—universality. At the tran-
scendental stage, we know next to nothing about the Apriori, aside from the wealth of 
its inner forms. This is why first phenomenology employs the promise of concretion 
and definitive intuition. Never can anybody or anything attain direct, unmediated 
access the reality of the object. But this ideal nonetheless orients phenomenology as 
a fundamentally agonistic exercize in speculative philosophy. Being realist does not 
mean comitting ourselves to the possibility of exhaustive knowledge pertaining to 
objects. Knowledge itself is only one type of access. Following Harman, we may speak 
of interobjective causality in terms of “translation”: “one object translates another in 
a more or less adequate way, and does so precisely by allowing the object to mani-
fest itself as something more than all of its current effects in our world” (Harman, 
2005, 245). Perception is one form of translation among countless other modes of 
access, which is necessarily transcendental. Husserl even states that empathy is noth-
ing if not an excercize in “transcendental aesthetics” (Husserl, 1960, 146). This idea of 
transcendental aesthetics is as beautiful evidence as any of the inherent sensuality of 
philosophical practice. Aesthetics and ontology need not stand in contradiction. The 
assertion that “styles belong to places and objects no less than to people” (Harman, 
2005, 139) is but a continuation of Husserl’s positing of “essential styles” as being char-
acteristic of certain syntheses (Husserl, 1960, 136).
How then must we go about solving the intuitive puzzle of integrating lawless, 
noematic pure explication into our reworking of first phenomenology? While refrain-
ing from direct empirical investigations, some considerations extracted from other 
disciplines may be of help in this regard. After all, in the Conclusion of Cartesian 
Meditations, Husserl himself enjoins us to seek after concepts applicable to all scienc-
es. Only in this manner can phenomenology become a “genuine universal ontology” 
capable of achieving a “systematic unfolding of the universal logos of all conceivable 
being” (Husserl, 1960, 155). Borrowing from other sciences, within the space of radi-
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cal phenomenology is not merely tolerated, but actively encouraged, as we, the medi-
tators, commit ourselves to following the master, inasmuch as this following entails a 
recommencement directed toward an uprooted rootedness. Why affirm this rooted-
ness within uprootedness? From whence does this ethical necessity originate? Robert 
Magliola sings the praises of a certain emotional commitment to the unimportance of 
our own subjectivity: 
Confronting my irreducible unimportance in the ‘grand scheme of things,’ and in ‘the eyes 
of the world’ (human society tends to be very ocular), I shall accept and even affirm this 
my unimportance. When I personally feel sad, and am mired in ‘is’ and ‘is-not,’ I shall try 
to use this stance at least to my advantage, — by ignoring my subject-hood and celebrat-
ing the object-world as it passes to-and-fro before me. (Magliola, 1997, 121)
Deconstruction too has a beautiful side, being a transcendental aesthetics that 
delivers us to a state of intuitive, yet vulnerable reflection upon the manifold nature 
of approaches, intentionalities and constitutions. Surfaces are strands composed of 
unfolded states, branching processes, looped chains, reduced or accentuated flexi-
bilities, bindings residing in synthetic unities. Now we pursue this state, be it a state 
of calm or an optimum level of material permeability or corporeal flexibility, other 
times we surrender to the impossibility of ever entirely accessing the all-embracing 
nexus of mobile clues, affordances, access-points to multiplicities and untapped gen-
erative potentials. Every surface is composed of a wealth of resources, all of which can 
be emplaced within a sequence or, conversely, repositioned within an entirely new 
system altogether. The sole obstacle is the intensity-threshold of the object’s inner 
connections. This is what determines the success or failure of an explication. As we 
have stated, following Husserl, the purity of an explication is strictly dependent upon 
its ability to unfold a set of existents. Pure explication is what confers “self-givenness” 
(Husserl, 1960, 102–103). Such a delineation, however, presents us with a new quan-
dry: if pure explication as expression only exhibits itself in the form of an intentionally 
specific objective unfolding (revealing, as it does, a multiplicity of objects and states), 
then it can only be accessed a posteriori. It is only in the aftermath of an unfolding that 
we can declare with any measure of confidence that the explication we bore witness 
to genuinely was, in hindsight, a pure explication. Favorably, first phenomenology 
does not lack the tools needed to resolve this difficulty. One of intuition’s roles is none 
other than to provide meditators with a pragmatics that allows them to enter into the 
eidetic Apriori, by bending temporality and retroactively emplacing science fictional 
philosophy in an autopositionality prior to even the purest of explications or expres-
sions. Self-explication, as the synthetic movement responsible for the production of 
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apodictic veracity, “always goes on,” Husserl informs us (Husserl, 1960, 102). Reality 
is a ceaseless experimentation with forms, products and surfaces, a delightfullyconsti-
tutive chaos whose features could very well await an adequate world-model for eter-
nity. The moment we believe we have captured the essence of explication, it escapes 
our clutches, for it is always going on, perpetually entering and exiting. Every single 
explication partakes of the universality of the mobile, innumberable Apriori (Husserl, 
1960, 103). Heterodoxical as it may sound, we assert that Husserlian explication is the 
originality of objectivity, and this originality pertains to the unfolding of existents, 
identified under the term “eidetic Apriori.”
LINES OF INTENTIONALITY
Every returning must have at least a preliminary intentionality reaching ahead 
of it, penetrating into the mists of a distant realm ideally suited for the establishment 
of a new scientific zone. As we have seen, purified and radicalized first phenomenol-
ogy contains nothing that would in itself inhibit cross-pollination with other disci-
plines. Therefore the emerging area of nanotechnology can serve as an entirely legit-
imate source of inspiration for a genuinely, that is, universally oriented ontological 
phenomenology. All-encompassing ambitions need not lead to disorientation. How-
ever great the danger, the affective excitement afforded by the discovery-process out-
weighs the risk of semantic pollution. Uncontrolled chain reactions are a danger every 
chemist knows all too well. Similarly, philosophers too are forever vigilant, guarding 
their systems against illegitimate usages or, worse, frivolous metaphorizations. But 
phenomenology, in its radical form, precludes systematic closure. All we need is to 
prove that its semantics can indeed be utilized in a realist manner. As a review article 
on nanotechnology explains, 
in DNA origami a long single strand of DNA (scaffold) is folded into arbitrary shapes by 
hundreds of short synthetic oligonucleotides, referred to as staple strands. Each of the 
staple strands is designed to bind to different places along the scaffold, thereby bringing 
these otherwise distant points into close proximity. (Tørring et al., 2011, 5636) 
Is there not a similar movement underway within our own first phenomenol-
ogy, a bringing of apparently distant points into ever closer proximity, until they are 
finally united within the transcendental subject? If anything, the source of inspiration 
for our own neo-Husserlian meditations is a desire to undergo a complete abandon-
ment, a resignation without measure. To attain everything, the meditator must lose 
all. Phenomenology is the practice of abstention with regard to the components and 
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flows of the vital stream (Husserl, 1960, 20). Yet this abstaining is a preliminary move, 
leading us to a theory of explication that would give room for every synthesis: no 
expressions may be excluded. Even unimaginable expressions and objects must be 
contained by an all-encompassing realism. The time of exclusion has ended. As we 
have seen, intentionality pertains to every single object. As Harman explains, objects 
always exist nested within other objects. Not only is intentionality interobjective, it is 
also intraobjective: 
…intentionality lies inside of other objects-namely, inside of the relations that I have 
with the objects of my perception. To repeat: intentional inexistence means to exist on 
the inside of an object, not to have the object inside of oneself. And whereas the usual 
model of containment seems to exclude anything other than animal sentience from the 
title “intentional,” the new model we propose is open to any entity whatsoever. Every 
object is intentional, because every object enters the inside of its own relations, its own 
overriding master-objects. (Harman, 2005, 202) 
New time, crystallizing itself through self-assembly into new expressions, is 
an infinitely inspired co-constitution exploding into the interstices of its own mas-
ter-object, enlivening its surroundings with arbitrary shapes that nonetheless trans-
form chaos into new syntheses. Intentionality spills into a manifold, a formal breadth 
whose structural characteristics preclude the One. Innumberably heterogeneous, the 
arbitrariness of the shape takes form—we say this without a shred of irony. Form is 
always there for the taking, within an object which behaves as an ecology for inner 
objects. Far from excluding the infinite regress, we must embrace it. Connections 
are mediated by the levels they traverse, number being nothing, if not a concrete 
attachment to a being. In this, number is not dissimilar to any sensual aspect or a 
ttribute. 
You will not find a givenness pertaining to all objectivities. Not even the cogito 
can be brought into adequation with one cogitatum in particular. All the more so, as, 
in relation to the original Cartesian concept of cogito, Jaakko Hintikka has shown that 
the cogito is inherently dynamic: “it refers to the ‘performance’ (to the act of thinking) 
through which the sentence ‘I exist’ may be said to verify itself ” (Hintikka, 1962, 17). 
The cogito is a performance, an execution, a self-verification, the very act of self-ref-
erential creation. And, in his own way, does Husserl himself not affirm that there 
pertains an infinity of acts, abundantly peppering the world with their effects? If the 
cogito is dynamism incarnate, truly no thing can be given in its entirety. The cogito 
too is a coil awaiting the advent of its unfolding into a hospitable place of abundance. 
Everything “means” something, in the sense that all objects refer to other objects. 
According to Husserl, there is no single perception of a house, but rather a range of 
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perspectives surrounding, encircling, and even interpenetrating, the house as partial-
ly given object. “The house-perception means a house—more precisely, as this indi-
vidual house—and means it in the fashion peculiar to perception; a house-memory 
means a house in the fashion peculiar to memory; a house-phantasy, in the fashion 
peculiar to phantasy [sic],” writes Husserl with a disarming simplicity that neverthe-
less does not elide the inherent complexity of phenomena (Husserl, 1960, 33). Could 
we not continue this list in perpetuity? In the same manner that one may speak of a 
house-perpcetion, we are also capable of describing a house-consistency, a house-so-
lidity, a house-elasticity, a house-breath, a house-uncanniness, or even a house-ru-
inedness. Houses, after all, must breathe. And if they lose their skins, ruination can 
easily result. It is not in the least preposterous to extend the dynamism of the cogito 
to include nonliving perceptions and performances, as Harman has done. “Perceiving 
and non-perceiving,” claims Harman, „must be found in the same entity at different 
times; they are modes of being rather than types of object […] objects do not perceive 
insofar as they exist, as panpsychism proclaims. Instead, they perceive insofar as they 
relate” (Harman, 2011, 122). Each relation is a kind of perception, in the sense that 
every relation exposes some sensual aspect of an object. If “I am given, in any case, 
with an open infinite horizon of still undiscovered internal features of my own,” as 
Husserl asserts, then this must also pertain in the case of objects (Husserl, 1960, 101). 
Objects too are given with open infinite horizons of their own. 
If connection is mediated by the level of being that object x has attained, then 
the cogito, conceived of as a synonym for the inherent dynamism of relationality, is 
defined by its extension. This duality equips us with a way of mapping relations in 
a new manner, while respecting the mutual autonomy of world-levels. Each present 
moment includes some measure of a past that cannot be eradicated or erased from its 
pertinent layers. On this point, Husserl is adamant: “to every perception there always 
belongs a horizon of the past” (Husserl, 1960, 44). Beyond every recollection, there 
pertains an infinity of various recollections and potentialities, as well as foreclosed 
pasts. Besides the fact of dinosaur extinction, for example, we find a range of possible 
trajectories terrestrial life could have taken. Apart the historical and social accident 
of momentary hominid dominance on Earth, we can easily envision other forms of 
intelligent life. A provocative 2018 paper, entitled “The Silurian Hypothesis,” posits 
just such a viewpoint in the form of the apparently absurd hypothesis that prehu-
man civilizations could, in theory, have existed upon the face of Earth without leaving 
behind much empirical evidence of their existence. Their demise would have gone 
unregistered a posteriori. The difficulty of proving or falsifying such a science-fic-
tion stems from the sheer temporal scale of geological phenomena. Furthermore, the 
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Earth’s history is marked by continuous disruptions and periodic calamities. As the 
authors summarize, 
warmings, and disruptions of the nitrogen cycle are ubiquitous. More complex changes 
in biota, sedimentation and mineralogy are also common. Specifically, compared to the 
hypothesized Anthropocene signature, almost all changes found so far […] are of the 
same sign and comparable magnitude. (Schmidt & Frank, 2018, 7) 
On a long enough timescale, nothing differentiates climate change driven by 
heightened vulcanic activity from climate disruptions caused by large-scale “purpo-
sive” industrial activity. Their intentionalities, the direction of their manifestation, 
are, from a geological perspective, completely identical. Our Earth periodically vom-
its up its own innards, sending terrestrial life into turmoil, unravelling ecosystems. 
Civilization could very well prove to be yet another one of these chaotic intervals, 
also known as “hyperthermals,” periods of intense and accelerated overheating of the 
Earth’s atmosphere. The Anthropocene is but one hyperthermal among many, the 
most severe to date being the Paleocene-Eocene Thermal Maximum 56 million years 
ago6. Intentionality reaches out beyond any single cogito, promiscuously attaching it-
self to a range of phenomena. Intentionality extends beyond any single performance. 
Notice that we do not seek to actively contradict Husserl. Rather, we, as radicals, expli-
cate and extend his fragrant words. We are behaving in the manner of the intentional, 
which „reaches out beyond the isolated subjective processes” (Husserl, 1960, 48). As 
the actuality of the mobile cogito, intentionality is constitutive and original in relation 
to change and variation. Differently put, intentionality is the “adhesive” that binds 
objects into relations within one another (Harman, 2005, 178). But this recognition 
also demands an anticipative idea of horizons—a pluripotential temporal background 
which fleshes out any being-there. Over there, within the speculative horizon, prehu-
man industrial civilizations could have existed. All the assembled evidence suggests, 
however, is the similtude of intentionalities among a range of different phenomena. 
In a way, phenomenologically speaking, industrial civilizations have “existed” prior 
to us—but solely (to the best of our present day empirical knowledge)—as an inten-
tionality resemblant of our own civilization. The directionality of intensified vulcanic 
activity, to all intents and purposes, really does resemble that of industrial society. But 
that is all we may posit. Resemblance is a caricature, and not reality as such. 
Constitutional theories and, it must be added, ontological semantics, can and 
ought to be combined. The sole constraint is the type of intentionality in question. 
6 The cause of the Paleocene-Eocene Thermal Maximum, which spans a mere two-hundred thou-
sand year timespan, is shrouded in mystery to this very day. To date, none of the scientific hypoth-
eses relating to its causes have withstood critical scrutiny (Schmidt & Frank, 2018, 5).
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Hence we as meditators must ceaselessly fix our attention upon the directions of the 
objects in question. Reversing, or rather, complementing Husserl’s original position, we 
can state without equivocation that not only does a “horizon-structure” belong to “every 
intentionality” (Husserl, 1960, 48), but also that several horizons can correspond to a 
single type of intentionality. In our example, the hyperthermal-intentionality, tending 
towards an accelerated overheating, even possible inflammation of the Earth’s atmos-
phere, correlates just as well with prehuman temporal horizons as that of anthropogenic 
climate change. Accordingly, the notion of “horizon” is an idea which anticipates that 
of explication or, synonymously, “clarification.” In spite of its positive connotations, we 
cannot but be struck by the double-sidedness of clarification. This word suggests a state 
of finality, a rational discernment that has brought to fruition, or a representation that 
has been fulfilled. Yet the actual meaning attributed to the process of clarification by 
Husserl is a perplexing one: “making clear is always a mode of making evident, of laying 
a synthetic course from an unclear intending to a corresponding ‘prefigurative’ intuition” 
(Husserl, 1960, 59). It is all too simple to miss the self-contradiction latent within the 
phrase “prefigurative intuition.” Rather than uplifting us to a state of rationally accessi-
ble critical reflection, clarification presents us with a downard movement. Clarification 
is a fall, a burrowing underneath figuration. That which clarifies stands in opposition 
to systematic knowledge, because its final product is… the prefigurative, the element 
prior to representation. Clarification cannot present us with a representation; its logic 
is that of the prehistoric, in the final instance, the prehuman. Differences are constitut-
ed amongst cogitos, peppering their surroundings with effects governed by their own 
intentionalities, steered in turn by the inner structures of the cogitatums. A connection 
encountered in eidetic form polarizes in all directions that open to its structurally coded 
potentialities. Not all can achieve realization, some intentionalities shall remain merely 
latent, redundant remnants of a time that never did flow out into expression. Besides 
the horizon of actualized elements, speculation also uncovers a “multiform horizon of 
unfulfilled anticipations” (Husserl, 1960, 61). Intentionality only pertains inasmuch as it 
is capable of flowing. The variation of forms is a constitution of differenes, always within 
a time immanent to the non-being of their undirectionality. It is in this latter sense that 
we must understand Husserl’s assertion that without “possibilities,” there would be no 
“fixed and abiding being” (Husserl, 1960, 60). Being is fixed, certainly, but only inas-
much as it abides! The fixity of Being/s is a correlate of its active movement. As long as it 
is in movement, every being in an apodicticity, an evidence that provides nourishment 
through clarity. Similarly, the cogito is fixed, but solely as a performance whose dou-
ble-sidedness applies both to its status as “a part of the proposition whose status (indu-
bitability) is at stake,” (i.e. Descartes famous cogito ergo sum), and its positionality, refer-
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ring as it does “to the performance through which the indubitability of this proposition 
is revealed” (Hintikka, 1962, 26). Husserl structures intentionality precisely in the same 
manner as Descartes registers the dynamic cogito of the ergo sum: referring to intention-
ality constitutes an intentionality in itself. But each intentionality, emplaced the space of 
first phenomenology, is also an objectivity (Husserl, 1960, 65). Because of its status as 
cosmic glue, it should come as no surprise to us when Husserl notes that “association” 
is “a matter of intentionality” (Husserl, 1960, 80). Communion is impossible without 
some determinate direction or sense of orientation. Connections, as encountered within 
presupposable systems of any kind, comprise all pure possibility-variants the volatility 
of which falls within an acceptable range of intensity. There are no entirely solid-phase 
syntheses within first phenomenology. Rather, static phenomenology is composed of a 
relatively cooled and hardened strata of passive syntheses. 
The manifold, be it a strand of coiled DNA prior to its reformation, or the possi-
ble new continent being born at this very moment in Iceland, is filled with passive and 
active intentionalities, whose outcomes shall be decided by the severity of the interven-
tion at hand. A manifold, indeed, is a but name for an entangled medley of active and 
passive intentionalities7 (Husserl, 1960, 98). That is not all, however. By virtue of what 
magical power or insrutable causality can a manifold unfold its intentionalities into the 
bosom of its surrounding world? Levels, as we have stated, are media of communication. 
Husserl’s monads too are not completely separated from eachother. They communicate 
through apperceptive transfers, mutual giftings of presence (Husserl, 1960, 110). If the 
cogito is a performance, then intentionality is coevolution incarnate. Various directions 
criss-cross one another, cutting across borders and bodily contours, resulting in a ka-
leidoskopic hybridization of components. Eidetically, apperception transfers are inten-
tional swappings. The phenomenon of gene-flow relates to spontaneous hybridization 
of genes amongst different species. Several preconditions are required for such transfers. 
In the case of P. canadensis and P. glaucus butterflies, apperceptive gene transfer through 
unconventionally selective mating is a possibility, because “their ranges meet in a hybrid 
zone and their flight times overlap” (Stump et al., 2003, 42). Hybridity necessitates the 
convergence of at least two distinct intentionalities. In the above case, we can identify 
four lines of intentionality, coalescing within one trading zone. Commerce is intentional 
communion, the mutually beneficial meeting of at least two lines of intentionality, re-
7 I define the term manifold as denoting a state of condensed, concentrated potentialities situated 
within a small area or territory. Paradoxically, the manifold may only be accessed in a retroac-
tive manner. It is only after unfolding has taken place that the manifold can be processed as such. 
Henceforth, its mode of execution is that of hiddenness. One could state explicitly that its mode of 
being corresponds to what Harman describes as the “hidden execution” of objects. 
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sulting in an acceleration of adaptation and the largescale xenotransplantation of bene-
ficial traits even amongst varied, widely dispersed populations. Intentional communion, 
achieved through mutually beneficial trade, results in the creation of new connections. 
Interactions based upon one another can motivate other activities, uniting distant pop-
ulations into greater unities. As the entomologists report, much to their surprise, the 
gene trading zone constructed by the butterflies has resulted in a marvelous common-
ality: “there is little or no genetic differentiation between the P. canadensis populations 
studied, even populations separated by Lake Michigan and distances in the hundreds 
of kilometers” (Stump et al., 2003, 47). Intentional communion is capable of defeating 
incredible obstacles. This is a direct consequence of the co-dependent arising of beings. 
The most self-sufficient of monads could not manifest its activities in the world with-
out coexistence with a set of entities responsive to its needs, heedful of its merits, and 
hospitable to its being. Monads exist in themselves as dynamic cogitos and with others, 
flowing in communion: “something that exists is in intentional communion with some-
thing else that exists” (Husserl, 1960, 129). Never is there a lack of relation: always, we 
uncover new connections within the common manifold. Owing to the power of emula-
tion, trading zones emerge within which objects can swap beneficial attributes. This is 
not to say that trading zones cannot become damaging enterprises, or infected with rival 
applications, say viruses that extract value without creating positivities of their own. But 
these possibilities should not blind us to the fact that every manifestation, however de-
structive it may seemn, must be considered as embodying some primal creativity.
CONCLUSION
In summary, we must ask the inevitable question: what, if anything, is first phenom-
enology good for? Have we arrived at an indubitable commonality? Does the communal 
nature of intentionality solve anything? One tentative conclusion we may draw from this 
brief foray in the appropriation of radical phenomenological semantics is that each com-
mencement points toward an open plurality, “an open community of monads” whose 
interactions cannot be reduced to a common time-form or singular dimensionality. Phe-
nomenology teaches, above all else, an unbounded “freedom from prejudice” (Husserl, 
1960, 6). The seriousness of this intention to free oneself of prejudice lends an ethical 
gravity to the phenomenological project, provided that phenomenology has not lost the 
will, spiritual energy and openness every rerooting requires. Our uprooting, driving us 
as it has dynamically through various modalities of existence, until we have reached the 
point of connecting and synthesizing that which formerly was distant. In our meditation, 
the distance between realism and phenomenology has been bridged through the concept 
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of unfolding, encapsulated as it is within the dynamic Husserlian concept of the uncon-
ditionally universal Apriori. It is the universality of Husserl’s Apriori that allows for its 
borderless applicability. Not unlike the Cartesian cogito, reconfigured by Hintikka in the 
mode of dynamic performativity, the Apriori is conceptualized in terms of ceaseless un-
folding. First phenomenology, first in the radical sense of achieving a truly all-encompass-
ing grounding, would be the philosophical science of all-encompassing intentionality. Or, 
more precisely, a mode of philosophical investigation that, having undergone a fateful de-
construction, shall never again privilege any single intentionality above any other inten-
tionality. Every intentionality is unique, but this individuality in no way implies complete 
self-sufficiency. The Husserlian concept of “apperceptive transfer” allows for an account 
of how monads can communicate and co-construct intentional communions or, what 
we have chosen to call “trading zones,” places of concentrated hybridity and accentuated 
commonality. Every manifestation has an intentionality of its own. First phenomenology, 
having shed its attachment to mental life, can finally commence remapping reality. Radi-
calism is a rerooting of oneself within the manifold of the real.
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